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During his annual address to the Federal Assembly on February 21, 2019 Russian president Vladimir Putin highlighted 
Moscow’s growing preoccupation with relationship building across the Indo-Asia-Pacific. China, India, the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Japan were singled out as players with which Moscow plans to have either special 
partnerships or close and robust relations. With respect to Tokyo, Putin’s remarks may be haven been more aspirational 
than realistic, given Russia’s hard stance on the ongoing territorial dispute. 
 
Russia does not have a clearly articulated and adopted regional policy for the Indo-Asia-Pacific. As in the past, the China 
factor dominates Russia’s regional strategic thinking and will continue to be one of key determinants of the level of 
current and future involvement in regional affairs. The Russians have a different geo-strategic outlook, effectively 
rejecting the Indo-Pacific geopolitical construct, a system which they believe supports the interests of the United States 
and its key allies. Nevertheless, Moscow is accelerating efforts to develop regional political and security frameworks that 
would suit its long-term agendas based on both bilateral strategic partnerships and engagement with regional 
frameworks. 
 
The Economic Vector 
 
Contrary to the Cold War era, when strategic and ideological considerations were the prime basis of Soviet Pacific 
strategy, the current reengagement is driven by economic ambitions: extensive exploration and extraction of key natural 
resources; establishing a complete supply chain, particularly for the export of energy resources; turning the Russian Far 
East into a regional hub of national aerospace and shipbuilding industry; supporting export of advanced military 
technology to regional clients; creating a Europe-Pacific strategic transit corridor; and attracting foreign investment. 
  
Russia is positioning itself as a future corridor between Pacific Asia and Europe, as well as a major supplier of energy 
resources and agricultural goods to growing Asian economies. To achieve this goal, the Russian Government aims to 
upgrade maritime infrastructure (currently, sea transport accounts for 97 percent of transport services offered by the 
Russians to foreign clients in the Pacific). The utilisation of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) is being viewed by the Russians 
as one of their geo-economic objectives with respect to the Arctic and the Far East. The set target is to see an increase of 
maritime traffic via the NSR to 80 million tons a year by 2030, compared with some 17 million tons in 2018. In addition, 
plans are in place to expand land-based communications networks. Russia continues advocating a strategic proposal to 
connect the Trans-Korean railway with Russia’s Trans-Siberian railway, thus creating a strategic link between Western 
European and Russian industrial and transport hubs with South Korean warm water ports. 
 
Russia’s expansionist energy strategy aims at furthering Russia’s position as the energy superpower in the Indo-Asia- 
Pacific context. In particular, the opening of the 2,600 mile-long ‘Eastern Siberia–Pacific Ocean’ pipeline network would 
help the Russians achieve their ambitious target of supplying China with more than 100 billion cubic meters of gas by the 
mid-2030s, in addition to other exports across the region. 
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Adding to that, Moscow’s medium-term ambition is to secure select high-tech niches in the regional market, particularly in
aerospace and shipbuilding. Besides, the Zvezda super shipyard mega project, Russia’s Sukhoi aircraft construction facility in
Komsomol’sk-na-Amure KNAAPO, and the Vostochny space launch facility will allow Russia to create a regional multi-role
high-tech aerospace hub.   
 
The Military Vector 
 
Russia also has a set of more traditional geo-strategic considerations, including: 
• Significantly lowering prospects of a military-strategic standoff with the United States and its Pacific allies; 
• Addressing the continuous qualitative modernization of the Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF) while managing the ongoing
Russia-Japan territorial dispute; 
• The standoff on the Korean Peninsula and the risk of unprovoked conflict or escalation;  
• Considerable increase of People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) offensive capabilities and the qualitative leap they achieved
over the past ten years; and 
• The growing strategic significance of the Arctic theater, including the Northern Sea Route (NSR). 
• Russia’s growing strategic interests in the region, including Antarctica.  
 
After years of continued decline and neglect, Russian military power in Asia and the Pacific is making a major qualitative leap.
By 2020 forces of the Eastern Military District would receive a total of more than 7,980 items of new and upgraded armaments
and heavy equipment, including main battle tanks; tactical missiles and heavy artillery systems; air defence systems; radars,
electronic warfare; aircraft and other. For example, by mid-2018 Russian air force units deployed in the theatre received some
300 new and modernized fixed wing and rotary aircraft, which is approximately the total strength of the Royal Australian Air
Force (RAAF). The Russian Pacific Fleet is expected to receive some 70 new warships and auxiliaries, including at least 11 nuclear-
powered and diesel-electric submarines, and 19 new surface warships by 2027. Russia is showcasing its ability to exercise military
power in a variety of ways. From late August to mid-September 2018, the Russian military carried out the Vostok 2018 strategic
manoeuvres and wargames, Russia’s single largest show of its military power over the past 37 years. According to the Russian
Ministry of Defense, the wargames involved 297,000 personnel, more than 1,000 fixed wing and rotary aircraft, a significant
number of unmanned aerial vehicles, around 36,000 items of heavy military equipment, and approximately 80 warships and
auxiliaries. The exercises signalled that Russia is readying itself for a possible confrontation with a large, technically sophisticated
military force, reinforcing Putin’s perceived intention to reassert Russia’s status as a global power. 
 
Russia’s growing strategic intimacy with Beijing should be not be underestimated. The Chinese military uses every opportunity
to learn from Russia’s war-experienced armed forces. The PLA’s participation in Vostok 2018 under Russian command offered a
major opportunity to learn first-hand from a battle-hardened major military force. Russia continues to be one of the two
principal providers of advanced military technology in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. In 2017–18, Russia was supplying 52 countries, and
foreign defense orders totaled $45 billion, effectively retaining the number two position in global arms sales. Over 60 percent of
Russian arms exports go to Asian countries, among them India, China, Vietnam, Myanmar, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan,
Thailand, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and others. In fact, Southeast Asia accounts for 43.1 per cent of Russian arms sales. Russian-
made systems such as variants of the Sukhoi aircraft, S-400 long-range air defense systems, Type 636.1 Kilo class diesel attack
submarines and other supplied to a number of regional clients allow their users to deploy advanced military capabilities. Besides
close security and defense relations with China, India, and more recently Pakistan, Russia is very active in developing robust
security and defense cooperation with small states in the region such as Sri Lanka and Fiji. Moscow sees opportunities vis-a-vis
military-technological and maritime security cooperation; peacekeeping; search and rescue and disaster relief; combating
various forms of organised crime such as piracy, counter narco-trafficking and contraband; and counter-terrorism.  
 
Contrary to the 1990s and early 2000s Russia’s strategic behavior in the Indo-Asia-Pacific context contradicts the conventional
view of Moscow being a peripheral player with marginalized interests and even fewer options to exercise its influence. In fact,
Russia acts as an experienced strategic spoiler, and its behavior is likely to impact the evolving geostrategic landscape of Pacific
Asia. 
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